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Indemnification of the Corporate Insider: Directors'
and Officers' Liability Insurance
I. INTRODUCTION
Any individual in the position of a corporate director or offi-
cer faces potential liability from a number of sources. The threat
of liability and attendant litigation expense1 leads an insider to
seek means of transferring the risk of loss from himself to his
corporation. He may seek assurance of indemnification through
the common law, state statutory schemes or contractual provi-
sions with the corporation. These methods, however, cannot
provide complete security2 and the insider may be forced to ex-
amine the comprehensive director and officer liability insurance
plans that are now available. The insurance not only indemni-
fies insiders in many instances where the corporation cannot,3
but also reimburses the corporation for those expenses it does
incur through indemnification of its insiders. The purpose of
this Note is to determine how well this insurance meets the
separate needs of insiders and their corporations in light of the
liabilities to which each may be exposed. This evaluation will
be made with special emphasis on the new Minnesota indemnifi-
cation statute4 and under the assumption that the corporation has
exercised its power to indemnify to the limits of that or a similar
act.
II. BASIS OF INSIDER LIABILITY
When an individual accepts a directorship or office 5 in a
corporation he also accepts the accompanying potential personal
1. Professor Hornstein as early as 1939 estimated that attorney's
fees average 20 percent of the amount recovered in a derivative suit.
Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum.
L. REv. 784, 813 n.187 (1939). In the past the insider has usually been
represented by the same counsel that represented the corporation.
However, recent decisions in derivative suits have denied this privilege
because of the adverse interests of each party. E.g., Lewis v. Shaffer
Stores, 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). This trend may be further
extended to third party suits where it is the attorney's duty to "contend
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." A.B.A.,
CANONS OF PROFESsIONAL ETHics 6 (1967).
2. Even the most liberal indemnification statute does not allow
the corporation, for example, to indemnify for all costs, other than
expenses including attorney's fees, incurred in the settlement of a deriva-
tive suit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1968); Mrnw. STAT.§ 301.095(2) (MxN. SESs. L. SERV. ch. 983 (1969)).
3. See note 2 supra.
4. MiNN. STAT. § 301.095 (MxxxN. SESs. L. SERV. ch. 983 (1969)).
5. Directors and officers will be referred to hereinafter collec-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
liabilities. These liabilities may arise from suits by a share-
holder on behalf of the corporation as well as from suits by third
parties. In either type of suit, liability will be based on either
a failure to exercise due care in corporate affairs0 or a lack of
undivided loyalty to the corporation in corporate transactions.7
Shareholders' derivative suits are brought by stockholders
on behalf of the corporation to enforce corporate rights against
insiders8 who have allegedly breached their duty to the corpora-
tion. Since the suit enforces corporate rights, all benefits de-
rived therefrom accrue to the corporation and not to the stock-
holder directly.9 Derivative suits are brought for various rea-
tively as "insiders." This definition is not to be confused with the
statutory definition of an insider-a holder of 10 percent of the shares of
a corporation-for 16(b) purposes. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 16 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
6. See generally 1 G. HoRes=Tra, CoRPorAtioN LAW & PRACTICE§ 446 (1959 & 1968 supp.); Neilsen, Director's Duties Under Anglo-
American Corporation Law, 43 DET. I,.3. 605 (1966); Adkins & Janis,
Some Observation on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20 Bus. LAw.
817 (1965). Some jurisdictions have enacted statutory standards of due
care. The main difference between them is whether the insider should
be held to a standard of care commensurate with that which he would
exercise in his personal business affairs or to a standard of care which
ordinarily prudet men would exercise in similar positions. Compare
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958), with N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 717 (McKinney 1963).
7. See M. FEuER, PERsONAL LInamEs or CoRPoRATE OFFIcERs AD
DIREcToRs 31-34 (1961). As long as the insider considers only the cor-
poration in his decisions, he exercises proper loyalty. However, he may
be liable for a breach of loyalty in those situations where his decision,
although seemingly in the interests of the corporation, was actually in
his own interest or the interest of another. Globe Woolen Co. v.
Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918). See gener-
ally Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966); DEL. CoDE AN. tit. 8, § 144 (1968).
8. See generally Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes
on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 980 (1957). For representative
procedural requirements for bringing the derivative action, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1.
9. In the past, all damages from a settlement agreement were
the property of the stockholder who brought the suit. Hornstein, New
Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLumv. L. REv. 1 (1947).
With this in mind stockholders had brought suit with little more than
a colorable claim in hopes of settlement. To remedy this situation,
courts and legislatures provided that all benefits would be the property
of the corporation. E.g., Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d
443 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1947); Wis. STAT. ANr. § 180.405(2), (3) (1957).
As a further guard against unfounded litigation, legislatures made it
more costly for the stockholders to bring suit by passing security-for-
expenses statutes requiring bonds to be posted covering the cost of the
litigation. N.Y. GEm. CoRP. LAw § 61-b (McKinney 1943) (security
must be furnished if requested unless the shareholder represents either
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sons: conflict of interest,10 personal appropriation of a corporate
opportunity," negligence in permitting antitrust violations to
occur,' 2 misuse of corporate funds,' 3 performance of ultra vires
acts' 4 and self dealing'-the most common of all allegations.
Where the insider's action has caused harm to third parties
in addition to, or instead of, the corporation, those parties may
bring an action in their own right against the insider. Although
the corporation is normally joined, the insider may be person-
ally liable for a portion of the expenses or entirely liable for
fines imposed. 16 Unlike the derivative action, all benefits de-
rived from the suit inure to the plaintiff. Several classes of
third parties may be harmed by the insider and thus have stand-
ing to sue: a shareholder may attempt to protect an individual
rather than a corporate right; 7 a competitor may bring action
alleging antitrust 8 or patent infringements; 9 parties in con-
five percent of the outstanding shares or shares with a market value in
excess of $50,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. 180.405(4) (1957) (security must
be furnished if requested unless the shareholder represents three percent
of the outstanding shares). These statutes have been criticized as strik-
ing a fatal blow to the derivative suit when only a prohibition on secret
settlements was needed. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders"
Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALw. L. REv. 123 (1944). These stat-
utes may also be criticized for imposing the burden of a successful de-
fendant's attorneys' fees upon the shareholder who must post security,
while the larger shareholder who is excepted from posting security
need not meet this liability.
10. E.g., Fleishhacker v. Blum, 21 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1937).
11. E.g., Fayes, Inc. v. Kline, 136 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
12. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Del.
CLt 1962).
13. E.g., Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. Ch. 1962).
14. E.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
15. See generally 1 G. HomnsTEI, supra note 6, at §§ 439-40.
16. Venner v. Southern Pac. Co., 279 F. 832 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
258 U.S. 628 (1922).
17. Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (enforce
preemptive rights); Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331,
341-42 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1954) (Fuld, J., dissenting) (contest recapitaliza-
tion). Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (protection of
preemptive rights by assertion of violation of federal proxy rules); Kar-
don v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (protection
of stockholder's right to purchase or sell securities free of fraudulent
practices by seller or buyer).
18. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962). The unlucky insider
might also incur further liability in a derivative suit for damages in-
flicted upon the corporation for violation of federal antitrust law. Fan-
chon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.
1953).
19. Deering, Miliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 160 F. Supp.
463, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), modified, 274 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1960).
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tractual relationships with the corporation may allege induce-
ment to breach the contract 20 or the federal and state govern-
ments might bring criminal actions alleging violation of federal
security, antitrust or income tax laws. 21
In certain actions, in addition to their common law duties
to act with care and undivided loyalty, insiders must, because
of their status, comply with restrictive statutory standards of
responsibility.22 A status liability is a liability imposed when
personal dealings are presumed to create a conflict of interest
with the insider's position. The liability would not attach but
for the fact that the party is an insider, and as such subject
to restrictive conduct because of his proximity to internal corpo-
rate affairs. Federal security laws, for example, impose status
liability on the insider who makes a short-swing transaction in
his corporation's stock.2 3 He is liable to the corporation in a hy-
brid derivative suit for his profits.24
Ill. THE LAW OF INDEMNIFICATION
A. THE COMMON LAW
At common law an insider who had been unsuccessful in his
defense of a derivative suit had no right of indemnification from
the corporation.2 5 The wrongdoing insider could not justifiably
be reimbursed by the very party that his misconduct had
harmed. Though this rationale is inappropriate when the in-
sider is successful in his defense of a derivative suit, early cases
denied indemnification in such situations because the expenditure
of corporate funds would not produce a benefit to the corpora-
20. Potter v. Minskoff, 2 App. Div. 2d 513, 156 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874
(4th Dept. 1956) (liable only when inducement was in bad faith).
21. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURiTiES REGULATION 1682-1862, 1894-
2004 (2d ed. 1961); H. BALLANTINE, COnIWORATIONS § 347 et seq. (Rev. ed.
1946); 7 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INComE TAxATIoN § 39.01 (1955).
22. See Bishop, New Cure For An Old Ailment: Insurance
Against Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAw. 92, 95-96 (1966).
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b)
(1964).
24. Professor Bishop also characterizes liability arising from a
10 (b)-5 action as status liability. Bishop, supra note 22, at 95-96. Since
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), the class of
insiders that is subject to this restrictive statutory conduct, i.e. use of
insider information, is not subject to succinct definition. The uncer-
tainty as to whom may be deemed an insider may render the status
label useless as to this liability.
25. E.g., Hollander v. Breeze Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507(Ch. 1941). See also Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate
Directors in Stockholders' Suits, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 431, 433 (1940).
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tion, and thus would be ultra vires. In Griesse v. Lang,26 an
action for restitution of company funds paid for attorneys'
fees in the insider's successful defense of a derivative suit,
the court held that there must be "some benefit to the cor-
poration, or that some interest of the corporation"2 7 must be
threatened before the directors could be reimbursed from the
corporate treasury.28 The landmark case of New York Dock
Company v. McCollom29 climaxed the confusion over the com-
mon law theory that a successful defendant insider must show
corporate benefit as a condition of indemnification. In that case,
the corporation brought a declaratory judgment action to de-
termine whether it had an obligation to indemnify the insider.
The court not only held that there was no obligation to indem-
nify, but also intimated that there was no power to do so in the
absence of any benefit extended to the corporation by a success-
ful defense. The court refused to recognize that the real test of
benefit lay not in a tangible item which could be shown in the
corporation's balance sheet, but in the intangible relationship
between the corporation and the insider. As one commentator
suggests, indemnification of insiders who successfully defend
charges against their conduct insures that they will remain with
the corporation and continue to aid and improve it.So
In an attempt to overcome the holding of Griesse and the
implications of McCollom, several states passed statutory provi-
sions authorizing indemnification of successful insider defend-
ants.3 ' At the same time, the Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
clined to follow McCollom,3 2 holding that there was a common
law obligation to indemnify the insider for a successful defense
of a derivative suit even in the absence of any direct, tangible
benefit to the corporation."3 In so holding, the court compared
26. 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
27. Id. at 558, 175 N.E. at 223.
28. The earlier case of Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W.
581 (1907) had allowed indemnification to an insider who was success-
ful in defending a quasi-derivative suit. During the litigation, a share-
holders' resolution was passed authorizing indemnification, although it
was not mentioned by that court. However, Figge was distinguished
in Griesse on the ground that the corporation in Griesse had not passed
such a resolution. See generally G. WASMNGTON & J. BisHoP, INDFm-
NIF YNG THE CORPORATE ExEcuT=E 56-58, 85 (1963).
29. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
30. See Frampton, Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses,
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 325, 327-28 (1958).
31. E.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 209, § 1; ch. 350, § 1 (1941).
32. Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941).
33. 'While I find that the company was benefited, I am not to be
understood as holding that the fact of benefit to the company is an
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the position of the insider to that of the trustee, stating that
the insiders had a duty to the stockholders to defend their posi-
tion. In the later case of In re E. C. Warner Company,3 4 also
involving a derivative suit, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
an obligation to indemnify the successful insider on the sole
ground that to do so would produce sound corporate management
-a prerequisite for responsible corporate action. The New Jer-
sey and Minnesota decisions cast doubt upon the implications of
McCollom that at common law a corporate benefit must accrue
to the corporation before it might indemnify the successful in-
sider 35
A third party action against an insider does not involve the
enforcement of a corporate right. Consequently, there is no pos-
sibility of producing a conflict of interest between the corpora-
tion and the insider by indemnifying the latter with corporate
funds. Courts, therefore, have not been concerned with whether
or not a benefit has been extended to the corporation. Rather,
the inquiry is whether the insider was acting as an agent of the
corporation when committing the act causing the litigation.
Under accepted agency principles, the principal has a duty
to reimburse an agent for expenses incurred by the agent in his
capacity as such.30 In the two major cases in this area, however,
the insider-agent has failed in his attempt to compel the corpora-
tion-principal to indemnify him.s'  In both cases, the insider
could not demonstrate satisfactorily that his authorized agency
powers included the act in question.38 Presumably, however, the
element of the directors' right to reimbursement or indemnification un-
der such circumstances as are here present." Id. at 272, 19 A.2d at 348.
34. 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
35. The effect of Warner today must be viewed with reference to
Tomash v. Midwest Tech. Dev. Corp., 281 Minn. 21, 160 N.W.2d 273
(1968), where the court questioned -the continuing effect of Warner
after the passage of the former Minnesota indemnification statute,
lMNN. STAT. § 301.09(7) (1953). For a full consideration of Tomash,
see Comment, 53 AIvNw. L. REV. 1055 (1969).
36. Hollandale Marketing Ass'n v. Goemat, 245 Minn. 154, 72 N.W.
2d 376 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 439, comments
& h (1958).
37. Standard Galvanizing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 736 (7th
Cir. 1953); Hoch v. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co., 173 Minn. 374, 217
N.W. 503 (1928).
38. The factual situation in Hoch v. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co.,
173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503 (1928) is worthy of note. The plaintiff-
president secured a customer's debt by accepting title to certain lands
in his own name. He reconveyed the property when the debt was satis-
fied. Fifteen years later he was joined with all parties whose names
were in the chain of title in an action in which the Government charged
[Vol. 54:667
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corporation would be obligated to indemnify the insider if such
inclusion could be established.
B. STATUTORY LAW
The inadequacies and uncertainties of common law indem-
nification prompted the majority of states to enact statutory
provisions on indemnification. These statutes fall into four gen-
eral classes: those which obligate the corporation to indemnify
the insider; 39 those which give the corporation power to indem-
nify; 40 those which provide for court approved indemnification, 41
and those which combine "corporate obligation" and "corporate
power" to indemnify.42
that there had been fraud in securing the patent to the land. He suc-
cessfully defended that suit and brought the present action to compel
indemnification. The court stated that the "complaint shows the ex-
penses in defending the suit ... were caused by the independent and
unexpected wrongful act of the United States, for which the defendant
[corporation] was in nowise responsible." Id. at 377-78, 217 N.W. at 504.
This reasoning implies that the act would not come within the author-
ized power of the agent unless the action of the principal caused lia-
bility to the agent. Cf. Hadley v. Coffin, 188 Iowa 896, 176 N.W. 885
(1920). Contra, Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201
(2d Cir. 1936).
39. Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.375 (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355
(1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18 (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.407 (1957). In addition, both South Carolina and Wisconsin give
the corporation power to indemnify the insider. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-
12.2(18) (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.04(14) (1957).
40. ALAsKA STAT. tit. 10, § 10.05.009(15) (Supp. 1968); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 31-2-1(15) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320
(1960); D.C. CODE AN. § 29-904(p) (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.13
(14), (15) (Supp. 1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-202(b) (10) (1960); IowA
CODE AN. § 496A.4(15) (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 146
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64 (1957); MIc. STAT. ANN. § 450.10
(L) (1967); Mss. CODE ANN. § 5309-04(o) (1966); MONT. REv. AN.
§ 15-2204(o) (replacement volume 1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2005
(Supp. 1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070(6) (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-24-4(o) (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-04(15) (1960);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (1964); Opr. REv. STAT. § 57.030
(15) (1967); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-9-12 (1956); S.D. SEss. LAws
ch. 23 § 11.1103(4) (1965); T=x Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.02(16) (1956);
UTAH CODE AN. § 16-10-4(o) (replacement volume 1962); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-18a (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.4(o) (replace-
ment volume 1965).
41. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West 1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-19
to 55-21 (replacement volume 1965).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 22-717 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 3010 (Supp. 1968); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12.83 (Supp. 1968); MiNN. STAT. § 301.095, (MIN. SEss. L.
SERv. ch. 983 (1969)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 3-5 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw §§ 721-26 (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. 15 § 410
(Supp. 1969); VA. CODE AN. § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1968).
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The major shortcoming of most of these indemnification
statutes is their failure to differentiate third party suits from
derivative actions.43 The statutes were enacted to eliminate the
necessity of a "corporate benefit" as a prerequisite for voluntary
indemnification of a successful insider.44  However, they have
been applied to third party actions45 even though the policy be-
hind the statutes is pertinent only to derivative suits. 40  In con-
trast, the newly enacted Minnesota statute,47 a member of the
fourth class, recognizes the fundamental differences between
the actions. The statute thus preserves the derivative suit by
not allowing its effect to be easily abrogated by unlimited in-
demnification of insiders. A comparison of the Minnesota statute
with those of other states highlights the problems which all
attempt to meet and the various means by which they may be
solved. 48
1. The Unsuccessful Insider
Most states deny corporations the power to indemnify an
insider in either a derivative or -third party action where the
insider is found liable for negligence or misconduct in the per-
formance of his duties.49  An insider's unsuccessful defense,
therefore, will normally preclude any corporate indemnification,
even where he had acted in complete good faith and in a manner
which he felt was in the best interests of the corporation. The
Minnesota statute, however, allows indemnification of unsuccess-
ful insiders when a particular subjective standard of conduct
has been met. The unsuccessful insider may be fully indemni-
fied in a third party suit if he acted in good faith and in a man-
43. E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. . 1701.13 (E) (Supp. 1955). But
see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-19, 55-20, 55-21 (Supp. 1955).
44. See Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395,
113 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1953).
45. E.g., Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Products,
Inc., 164 A.2d 437, 441 (Del. Ch. 1960).
46. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
47. MINN. STAT. § 301.095 (MnN. SEss. L. SERV. ch. 983 (1969)).
This statute was modeled after the new Delaware indemnification stat-
ute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1968). The Delaware indem-
nification statute is the product of the combined efforts of the Dela-
ware Revision Commission and the Committee on Corporate Laws of
the Section of Corporation and Business Law of the American Bar
Association. The Model Business Corporation Act's counterpart to
the Delaware statute replacing section 4(o), is section 4A. It is sub-
stantially identical to the Delaware Act.
48. For a lengthy comparison of the particulars of each statute, see
G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 28, at 112-68.
49. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(1) (1966).
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ner he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best
interests of the corporation. With respect to any criminal action
or proceeding, he may be indemnified if he had no reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.50 However, in a
derivative suit, because of the anomalous situation that would be
present by allowing indemnification of an unsuccessful insider
-payment from the insider to the corporation and back
to the insider-the insider, when acting in good faith and in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in, or not opposed to,
the best interests of the corporation, can be reimbursed only for
expenses. Where the insider has been adjudged liable for negli-
gence or misconduct he may receive indemnity for such expenses
only if the court finds him "fairly and reasonably entitled to in-
demnity."' l5
2. The Successful Insider
The statutes which flatly preclude indemnification of insid-
ers who have been adjudged liable have an additional shortcom-
ing in that they provide no guarantee that the successful insider
will be indemnified.5 2 He is thus left to the mercy of the corpo-
ration's board of directors or stockholders.53 The Minnesota stat-
ute, on the other hand, is both protective and certain. In addi-
tion to its protection of the unsuccessful insider who is found
equitably deserving, it obligates the corporation to indemnify the
insider who "has been successful on the merits or otherwise"5 4
in defense of either a derivative or third party action.
50. MiNN. STAT. § 301.095(1) (MwNN. SESS. L. SEar. ch. 983 (1969)).
The determination of whether the standard of conduct has been met is
to be made " ... (1) by the board of directors by a majority vote...(2) ... by independent legal counsel in a written opinion, or (3) by the
shareholders." AMUN. STAT. § 301.095(4) (ANN. SEss. L. SEav. ch. 983
(1969)).
51. MyinN. STAT. § 301.095(2) (M.m. SEss. L. SERV. ch. 983 (1969)).
See also N.C. GrN. STAT. § 55-19, 55-20, 55-21 (replacement 1965);
CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 830 (West 1955) ("fairly and equitably" deserving).
52. See note 40 supra. On the other extreme are the statutes that
obligate the corporation to indemnify the successful insider, yet do not
grant a concurrent power to indemnify the unsuccessful yet equitably
deserving insider. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.375 (1962).
53. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (1960) (bylaw must be
enacted by a majority of stockholders); ME. REv. STAT. ANNx. tit. 13,
§ 146 (1964) (by-law, article or resolution must be enacted by a ma-
jority vote of stockholders).
54. miNN. STAT. § 301.095(3) (MINN. SESs. L. SEar. ch. 983
(1969)), [Emphasis added.] This provision obligates the corporation to
indemnify where the suit has been dismissed on a procedural ground,
e.g., the running of the statute of limitations.
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3. Settlements
Most statutes appear to treat settlements and successful ad-
judications alike.5 5 Those statutes that do differentiate usually
allow indemnification of settlemen'rs only where the insider is
free from actual negligence or misconduct, 56 as determined by
the board of directors 57 or independent legal counsel.5 8  Minne-
sota goes further and distinguishes settlement agreements in
third party suits from those in derivative actions. It allows re-
imbursement in settled third party actions subject to the same
standards required for indemnification of expenses accruing
from an unsuccessful defense,59 and explicitly states that the
"termination of any action ... by ... settlement"60 does not
imply that the standard has not been met. In settlements of
derivative actions, however, only expenses, including attorneys'
fees, are indemnifiable, since reimbursement of the amount paid
in settlement would have the effect of nullifying the suit.61
4. Exclusiveness of Statutes
The majority of the statutes provide that the statute "shall
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seek-
ing indemnification may be entitled under any bylaw, agree-
ment, vote of stockholders or disinterested directors or other-
wise .... ,,62 A literal interpretation would allow a corporation
maximum freedom to indemnify pursuant to any bylaw, agree-
ment or vote of the shareholders, and would abrogate rather
than complement the statutory policy of allowing indemnifica-
tion only under certain circumstances. Courts have bypassed
chances to interpret this provision and its exact meaning is un-
clear.63 Nevertheless, dicta in several cases imply that the stat-
55. E.g., ME. Rsv. STAT. Ax. tit. 13, § 146 (1964). The statutes
are silent on how they might treat settlements. Since the only exclu-
sion from the statute is that for an adverse final adjudication, it
seems logical that reimbursement pursuant to settlement would be al-
lowed.
56. E.g., Mo. A_-. STAT. § 351.355 (1966).
57. E.g., Ky. Ray. STAT. § 271.375 (1955).
58. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355 (1966).
59. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
60. Mrxx. STAT. § 301.095(1) (Mmw. SEss. L. SERV. ch. 983 (1969)).
61. MmN. STAT. § 301.095(2) (iMN. SESS. L. SEav. ch. 983 (1969)).
62. DEm. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (f) (Supp. 1968). The statutes that
allow only judicially approved indemnification do not have nonex-
clusive clauses. See note 41 supra.
63. E.g., Tomash v. Midwest Tech. Dev. Corp., 281 Minn. 21, 160
N.W.2d 273 (1968), noted in Comment, 53 Mxnw. L. Rav. 1055 (1968).
See generalyV G. WASBMiGTON & J. BISHoP, supra note 28, at 117-24.
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utory provision is indeed not exclusive as long as a corporation
does not attempt to override the policy of the statute.6 4 In Min-
nesota the nonexclusive clause refers only to corporate personnel
other than directors and officers; the statute is thus exclusive as
to directors and officers. 65 In addition, the statute specifically
proscribes any indemnification inconsistent with the overall
statutory policy. These statutory provisions are peculiar to
Minnesota; they are not found in the new Delaware statute nor
in any of its counterparts. Instead, the Delaware statute has re-
tained the nonexclusive clause, and thus fails in its attempt to
clarify and to delineate the law of indemnification.
5. Statutory Provisions Detailing and Developing the Law
of Indemnification
The Minnesota statute has further clarified the area of in-
demnification by specifically defining the type of proceedings
which may lead to indemnifiable expenses. While most statutes
merely refer to "any action, suit, or proceeding,"' 66 the Minne-
sota statute addresses itself to any "threatened, pending or com-
pleted action, suit or proceeding, wherever brought, whether
civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative . *.".."67 This
provision is an attempt to avoid litigation over the power to in-
demnify in nonjudicial and unripe proceedings.
The statute also specifically defines the classes of persons
who may be indemnified. Most statutes provide for indemnifi-
cation only of a limited group of individuals such as "each officer
and each director of the corporation" who incurs certain ex-
penses. 8 Minnesota includes a far wider class of individuals:
[A]ny person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made
a party to any threatened, pending, or completed action ... by
reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee
or agent of the corporation or is or was serving at the request
of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of an-
other corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other en-
terprise . . . .69
These inclusions-especially those of agents and insiders serving
at the request of the corporation in any other entity-increase
greatly the number of individuals subject to indemnification.
64. See Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 896
(3d Cir. 1953); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 182 A.2d
647, 653 (Del. Ch. 1962).
65. MmNN. STAT. § 301.095(6) (MiNN. SEss. L. SERv. ch. 983 (1969)).
66. E.g., MxcH. STaT. A N. § 450.10 (1) (1967).
67. MINN. STAT. § 301.095(1) (MINN. SEss. L. SF-v. ch. 983 (1969)).
68. E.g., Mr. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 146 (1964).
69. MINN. STAT. § 301.095(1) (MN. SEss. L. SEaRv. ch. 983 (1969)).
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With the exception of an independent contractor, it is difficult
to conceive of a person whose services ultimately accrue to the
corporation who could not be indemnified. In addition, the act
provides that indemnification will inure to the benefit of an in-
sider's heirs, executors and administrators.70
There is no need for the individual actually to incur personal
expenses before he is eligible for indemnification as is true under
other acts .71 The Minnesota statute authorizes a corporation to
advance expense money to the insider on condition that it be re-
turned if the corporation is not ultimately permitted to indem-
nify.
The statute also specifies the expenses for which an insider
may be indemnified. In third party suits, these costs include
"expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and
amounts paid in settlement." In contrast, the unsuccessful in-
sider in a derivative suit may be reimbursed only for expenses,
including attorneys' fees. Other statutes use language such as
"expenses actually and reasonably incurred .... -72 While such
language could possibly be construed. to cover the items specified
in the Minnesota statute, they lack the specificity and certainty
inherent in the latter provision. Expenses such as fines in other
jurisdictions might be subject to attack as unnecessary or not
truly an expense.
The Minnesota statute further provides that the individual
may be indemnified for a status liability73 as long as the act
creating the liability was not opposed to the corporation's inter-
ests.74 Statutes in other states have been interpreted to cover
only liabilities which arise from negligent acts or omissions of
insiders acting in their capacities as such. These statutes exclude
liabilities arising out of personal dealings proscribed because
of the insider's position.7 5  Thus, under other statutes, in-
siders will not be indemnified for liabilities resulting from per-
sonal dealings, such as a 16(b) action, even though the liability
is incurred solely because of their status as an insider.
70. MmN. STAT. § 301.095(6) (MINN. SEss. L. SERV. ch. 983 (1969)).
71. E.g., IOWA CoDE Ami. § 496 A.4(15) (1962).
72. E.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.030(15) (1967).
73. See Bishop, New Cure For An Old Ailment: Insurance Against
Directors and Officers Liability, 22 Bus. LAW 92, 95-96 (1966).
74. MiNN. STAT. § 301.095(1), (2) (MniN. SEss. L. SERV. ch. 983
(1969)). See generally, S. ARsHT & W. STAPLETON, ANALYSIS OF THE
NEW DELAWARE CORPORATIoN LAW 327 (1967).
75. Tomash v. Midwest Tech. Dev. Corp., 281 Minn. 21, 160 N.W.2d
273, 278 (1968) (former Minnesota indemnification statute conferring
power to indemnify upon the corporation).
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In essence, the Mnnesota act permits indemnification in a
far broader area than do the statutes of most other states. An
insider in a corporation with a permissive indemnification bylaw
who has acted in good faith will be indemnified for all expenses
except those paid pursuant to a judgment or settlement in a
derivative suit.
C. CORPORATE AGREEMENTS FOR INDEIUNIFICATION
Some form of contractual provision between the corporation
and insiders which sets guidelines for reimbursement of insiders
is a prerequisite to indemnification in most states, since the
statutes are merely permissive. This provision, whether bylaw,
resolution or otherwise, can obligate the corporation to indemnify
the insider as long as the standard of conduct that must be fol-
lowed is in harmony with the statute. The following provision
may also be essential in "corporate obligation" states, in that the
statute may allow indemnification following affirmative corpo-
rate action. Furthermore, with either type of statute, the agree-
ments may be interpreted as conferring broader powers or rights
of indemnification under the statute's nonexclusive clause.
Indemnification bylaws are typically modeled after modern,
comprehensive statutes. In general their purpose is to require
indemnification when a certain standard has been met, to segre-
gate third party and derivative suits, and to deal specifically with
settlements.7" The bylaws usually state that they shall not be
exclusive of other rights which an insider may have, presum-
ably under common law or statute.
The basic difference among corporation bylaws is the
standard of conduct that must be maintained by the insider
prior to the allowance of indemnification by the board or the
shareholders. The standards vary from denying indemnifi-
cation to the insider where he has been finally adjudged liable
for negligence or misconduct,7 7 to denying indemnification only
76. Most obligate the corporation to indemnify for amounts paid
in settlement when the corporation is advised by counsel that the insider
did not commit a breach of duty-General Motors Corp. Bylaws, quoted
in G. WASINGTON & J. BIsHoP, supra note 28, at 289-or if the stock-
holders approve-Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc. By-
laws, copy on file in the office of the Minnesota Law Review.
77. E.g., General Motors Corp. Bylaws, quoted in G. WASHINGTON
& J. BIsHoP, supra note 28, at 289.
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where the insider's action constituted gross negligence or willful
misconduct.78
The basic problem with any corporate agreement to indem-
nify is uncertainty over the treatment it may receive in the
courtroom. It is questionable whether a court will give literal
effect to the scheme of indemnification if the bylaw expands the
area of permissible indemnification beyond that expressly stated
in the statute. In essence, the question concerns the effect
that may be given to the nonexclusive clause of a statute.79
Few courts have faced the problem of indemnification under
a corporate bylaw or board resolution when the insider has un-
successfully defended a derivative suit, but where the question
has been raised the insider has not fared well. In Essential En-
terprises Corporation v. Dorsey Ccrporation,0 a resolution by
the board of directors was not sufficient to allow indemnification
in the settlement of a derivative suit. The court held that even if
the statute allowed indemnification, it was prohibited by a bylaw
because the suit resulted from insiders' failure to perform their
duties. Thus, the resolution allowing indemnification could not
affect the narrowly drawn bylaw. In Teren v. Howard,81 the
court ignored the nonexclusive clause and disallowed indemnifi-
cation even though the board of directors had passed a resolu-
tion providing therefor. The court simply held that, "the present
case falls within the exception provided for in the statute,"82
namely, that there will be no indenmification if the insider has
been adjudged liable. A third case, SEC v. Continental Growth
Fund,8 3 demonstrates the very restrictive effect given to corpo-
rate action purporting to broaden the statutory area of indemni-
fication. An insider was adjudged liable due to his negligence
in a derivative suit. A charter provision of the corporation al-
lowed indemnification except where the insider had been "ad-
judged liable because of willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross
negligence or reckless disregard of the duties involved in the con-
duct of his office." 84 The court disallowed indemnification by
reading the nonexclusive clause quite restrictively as allowing
bylaw but not charter indemnification provisions.
78. E.g., National Steel Corp. Bylaws, quoted in G. WASEn GTON
& J. BisHoP, supra note 28, at 293.
79. See generally Mace, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance,
85 BANKING L.J. 39, 43-44 (1968); Bishop, supra note 73, at 99-101.
80. 182 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 1962).
81. 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963).
82. Id. at 956.
83. C.C.H. FEi. SEC. L. REP. f 94,719 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
84. Id. at ff 94,722.
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These cases demonstrate that a corporation cannot circum-
vent a narrowly drawn statute since the contractual provision
must be in harmony with the general statutory scheme. As pre-
viously mentioned, indemnification inconsistent with the statute
is specifically proscribed in Minnesota. Other acts, that are mod-
eled after Delaware's, will meet the same reception as in the
cases noted above even though they contain the widest permis-
sible coverage. Corporate agreements beyond the policy of the
statute will not be tolerated, notwithstanding the nonexclusive
clause. Thus, amounts paid pursuant to a judgment or settle-
ment of a derivative suit, and possibly expenses incurred in a
derivative action, must be borne by the insider.
IV. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE
Some of the risks of loss to the insider and his corporation
may be transferred by the purchase of indemnification insurance.
The insider purchases this insurance to cover those liabilities
which will not be indemnified by the corporation-those risks
the corporation will not or cannot indemnify. The corporation
purchases the policy to obtain reimbursement for any in-
demnification actually paid to its insiders. Ideally it seeks
coverage for all indemnification expenses imposed on it by stat-
ute and assumed by it in its corporate agreements.
A. POWER TO PURCHASE INSURANCE
The Minnesota statute attempts to quash speculation that
a corporation cannot legally purchase directors' and officers' lia-
bility insurance. Previously, the expenditure of corporate funds
on this insurance was said to be ultra vires because the purchase
was not for the benefit of the corporation.8 5 Insurance com-
panies disputed such allegations by asserting that since the pre-
mium was apportioned between the insiders and the corporation
at a ratio of one to nine, the corporation was not expending its
funds on the insiders' coverage. This division of payment, how-
ever, has been challenged by commentators as illusory since the
potential liabilities of the insiders are far greater than 10 percent
of the policy's overall coverage.8 6 Therefore, the corporation is,
in fact, buying insurance for the insiders. The statute ends such
controversy by specifically empowering the corporation to pur-
chase and maintain insurance on behalf of the insiders.
85. Bishop, supra note 73, at 112.
86. Id.
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The Minnesota statute, 7 however, unlike the Delaware act,
does not allow the corporation to buy insurance covering insiders
in areas where the corporation is specifically not permitted to
indemnify. This provision stems from a legislative decision that
indirect means such as insurance cannot be used to accomplish
prohibited corporate indemnity, presumably because insurance
might abrogate the deterrent effect of liability. This departure
from the Delaware norm is unfortunate, particularly as applied
to derivative actions, where liability may result from seemingly
innocent yet negligent conduct. Possibly indemnification will
be tolerated if the insider continues partial payment, such as 10
percent of the premium. In that way, it might be argued that
the corporation is not purchasing the insurance, and therefore,
the indemnification will be allowed, notwithstanding the fact
that the corporation could not have indemnified the insider di-
rectly. However, since this apportionment of the premiums is
questionable, an insider may have a difficult time being pro-
tected from liabilities outside the scope of liabilities indemni-
fiable by the corporation.
B. MECHANIcs o THE POLICY
While many companies write directors' and officers' liability
insurance,88 there are only two sinificantly different forms:
that used by St. Paul Fire and Marine and that used by the Lon-
don insurers. The former is the only true American underwriter,
since all other American companies reinsure with the London
syndicates of Lesley Dew or Huxtable, both members of Lloyd's
Underwriters.8 9
87. MnN. STAT. § 301.095(7) (Mn. SEss. L. SERV. ch. 983(1969) ). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968).
88. E.g., Huxtable Syndicate, Forms ALS D4 & D5, as amended,
May 1, 1968 (Feb. 1967) (English form that is used by Stewart, Smith);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Form 16253 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
St. Paul Fire & Marine]; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Form GPO 3685 &
2687 R1 (Feb. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Liberty Mutual]; Employer's
Ins. of Wausau, Form 515-5228.1 & 515-5229.1 (Aug. 1966) [herein-
after cited as Employer's of Wausau]; the Travelers Indemnity Co.,
Form C-11961 & C-11962 (May 1967) [hereinafter cited as Travelers];
American Home Assurance, Form 2085/2086 (Aug. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as American Home]; American Employers' Ins. Co., Form A1880
(not dated) [hereinafter cited as American Employers'].
89. Interview with Minneapolis Office of Johnson and Higgins,
Insurance Brokers, April 2, 1969. Both Dew and Huxtable have varia-
tions in their particular form, yet in most respects they are identical.
For purposes of this Note the Huxtable London form, used by Stewart,
Smith as Form SS-3A & 3B [hereinafter cited as Stewart, Smith] will
be the policy used for the basis of analysis. Where there are substantive
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The Stewart, Smith policy, written on a London form, has
a "bi-policy" format with the main policy divided into two sub-
sidiary policies: (1) the Reimbursement for Directors' and Offi-
cers' Liability Insurance Policy, 0 and (2) the Directors' and Of-
ficers' Liability Insurance Policy.91 The former reimburses the
corporation for expenses of indemnification and the latter in-
demnifies the insider where the corporation has not. The policy
covers all present, past or future directors and all holders of
certain positions. Coverage inures, where applicable, to the bene-
fit of the estate, heirs or legal representatives of the directors or
officers. Newly created positions may be included in the policy
on giving notice to the insurer and remitting an additional pre-
mium. 92 The two subsidiary policies, although mutually exclus-
ive in their coverage, are complementary. The best example of
their interlocking nature is the provision in the directors and of-
ficers coverage which excludes from coverage any liability for
which the insider has received indemnification from the corpora-
tion, thus avoiding payment under both subsidiary policies.93
The insurers will not write one subsidiary policy without writing
its complement, presumably because of an inability to calculate
separate premiums.94
The policy, although serving to indemnify the corporation
and its insiders, is subject to the interpretation that it is in fact
a liability policy.95 Actual payment of the liability is a con-
dition precedent to collecting under an indemnification policy,
while under a liability policy, the insured's liabilities need only
be established. The "loss" clause in early policies obligated
the insurer to indemnify or reimburse the insured for "any
differences from this form, the other London form of Dew or the St.
Paul Fire & Marine form, they will be noted.
90. Hereinafter referred to as "the corporate coverage."
91. Hereinafter referred to as "the directors' and officers' cov-
erage."
92. The policies differ as to when notice must be given. The Stew-
art, Smith policy and the policies of Travelers, Liberty Mutual and
Employer's of Wausau provide for notice to the insurer in 120 days; the
policies of St. Paul Fire & Marine, American Home and American
Employers' provide 30 days.
93. E.g., Stewart, Smith, Form supra note 89, at SS-3A 5(h).
Other subsidiary policies even make reference to a "companion policy,"
e.g., Employer's of Wausau.
94. See Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80
HAv. L. REv. 648 n.83 (1967). St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. has
offered customers an individual director's policy. This policy, how-
ever, extends coverage to the director only so long as he does not be-
come chairman of the board or a salaried officer.
95. See generally Note, supra note 94, at 651-53.
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payment by the insured,"96 implying the policy was one of in-
demnification. Since the word "payment" has been deleted in
the present directors' and officers' coverage97 and the policy is by
name a liability policy, it would seem that the insured need not
make the payment before the policy is operative 5
The policy is written for a three-year period, and its cost
varies depending on the limit of liability and size of the com-
pany. Upon application for coverage, the corporation must sup-
ply current information as to the financial condition of the cor-
poration, including an annual report to stockholders, a Dun &
Bradstreet Report, and a statement as to the existence of any
previous legal difficulties.9 Combined premiums to the corpo-
ration and the insider for coverage from one to 20 million dollars
can run from 2,500 to 30,000 dollars a year.10 0 As previously
stated, the premium is apportioned on a nine to one ratio be-
tween the corporation and the insiders. 1 1 Upon termination of
96. Lesley Dew Form of August 1, 1.966 [emphasis added], cited in
Note, supra note 94, at 652. See also Employer's of Wausau, supra note
88, at 1 2 (c) ("the term 'loss' shall mean any payment by an Insured in
respect of his legal liability, whether actual or asserted"); Travelers,
supra note 88, IID ("loss means any payment made by the" insured);
St. Paul Fire & Marine, Conditions ff 1 (payment made).
97. Stewart, Smith Form SS-3A, szpra note 89, at 1 4(c); accord
Liberty Mutual 2(c). The corporate coverage leaves no question
that the policy is in the nature of liability insurance: "[L]oss shall
mean any amount the Company is required or permitted to pay ...
for a claim . . . whether actual or asserted . . . ." Other policies also
seem to be liability policies: in the American Home policy the loss
must be one which the insider is "legally obligated to pay;" accord
American Employers'.
98. Employer's of Wausau has a conflict between the name of the
policy, Directors and Officers Liability ]?olicy-and its wording of the
"loss" clause, see note 96 supra. Travelers and St. Paul Fire & Marine,
in addition to the verbiage of the "loss" clause implying that the
policy is an indemnification policy, also refer to their policies as
Corporate Reimbursement Indemnity Policies and Directors and Offi-
cers Indemnity Policies, respectively. It seems that these policies
will be interpreted as indemnification policies.
99. "No claim, which if insurance had been in force similar to that
now proposed, would have fallen within the scope of such insurance
has been made .... " Proposal for Directors and Officers Liability
and Company Liability Insurance, American Employers' Form A1881.
100. See Gray, Insurance Against Liabilities of Directors and Offi-
cers-A Forum, 22 REcoRD op N.Y.C.B.A. 342, 356-57 (1967).
101. As earlier noted, this apportionment has been attacked as
illusory on the ground that the insider's compensable liabilities are
greater than 10 percent of the total liabilities covered, and the corpora-
tion, therefore, is expending its resources on the insider's insurance.
Bishop, supra note 94, at 112; see text accompanying note 86 supra.
Some companies have attempted to overcome this criticism by selling
the subsidiary policies "separately." Though these companies still insist
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the policy, an additional year's coverage may be obtained for
liabilities arising in that year due to a wrongful act committed
previously.
The loss is incurred at the time written notice is given to
the insurer stating either that a third party intends to hold the
insured responsible for a wrongful act, or that the insured them-
selves have become aware of an occurrence that might give rise
to a future claim.10 2 The notice is to be given as soon as prac-
ticable, and failure to give notice will act as a waiver of the in-
sured's rights under the policy.
The insider gives up independent control of any lawsuit,
since he may neither incur expenses nor settle unilaterally
0 3
without the consent of the insurer. Such consent, however, can-
not be unreasonably withheld.10 4 Likewise, while the insured is
required to contest legal proceedings upon the advice of mu-
tually selected counsel, the insurer is liable for all costs if it
unreasonably forces the insured to contest.10 5
The insurer agrees to pay 95 percent of the incurred loss over
the deductible amount, which is usually set at $20,000 for each
loss. This amount serves both as a cushion protecting the un-
derwriter from small claims and as a deterrent to liability-pro-
ducing conduct. It is deductible for each loss, and thus it might
be possible to have the deductible amount subtracted twice from
on selling both subsidiary policies, they write physically separate poli-
cies. See note 91 supra. See also Brook, Officers and Directors Lia-
bility Insurance, 2 THE FoRuM 229, 235 (1967). Much comment has
been devoted to other public policy considerations, especially to the
question of whether indemnification will remove the deterrent effect of
liability on improper conduct. See generally Bishop, Sitting Ducks and
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors
and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968); Note, supra note 94; Note,
Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 CoLuM. L. REV. 716
(1967); Bishop, supra note 73.
102. The St. Paul Fire & Marine policy, supra note 89, at f 7 re-
quires notice "[fln the event of any occurrence likely to involve the
indemnity provided under this Policy...."
103. An insider may have various reasons for controlling or settling
a suit, whereas the underwriter is concerned only with the financial
aspect. Thus, relinquishing the decision to settle might be detrimental
to the insider. He may be forced to settle at times when he desires to
vindicate his name. Likewise, in cases where the insider may desire to
settle to avoid adverse publicity, he relinquishes this right if independ-
ent counsel feels that the claim should be contested.
104. The St. Paul Fire & Marine policy does not include the con-
dition of reasonableness.
105. E.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
426 P.2d 173 (1967). See generally Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal
to Settle, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 544 (1968).
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the limit of liability for two unrelated losses in the same year.
In addition, five percent of the liability above the deductible
amount is paid by the insured. This amount also is designed to
deter the insider from conduct which might produce liability.
C. THE ExTENT OF THE DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' COVERAGE
1. The Breadth of the Coverage
The policy purports to indemnify directors and officers for
"loss" arising out of any "wrongful act" committed by them.
The definition of those terms is the key to the breadth of the cov-
erage. "Loss" is defined as
any amount an [insider] is obligated to pay in respect of his
legal liability, whether actual or asserted, for a wrongful act...
and ... shall include damages, judgements, settlements, and
expenses incurred in the defense of actions, suits, or proceedings
and appeals therefrom; provided always that such subject of
loss shall not include fines or penalities imposed by law, or
other matters which may be deemed uninsurable under the law
pursuant to which this policy shall be construed.106
One question immediately apparent is whether coverage
could be limited by interpreting the term "penalties" to include
punitive damages. In the majority of states, punitive damages
serve as a penalty'0 7 but in others they are viewed as compen-
satory. 0 8 The literal meaning of the phrase "penalties im-
posed by law" is subject to the valid interpretation that punitive
damages are a penalty imposed by law and thus, excluded from
coverage.
Treble damages might also be excluded because of their
punitive nature. The purpose of treble damages also varies
among jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, treble damages are
thought to compensate the plaintiff for damages which cannot
be reasonably calculated. 0 9 Other jurisdictions regard them as
an inducement to provide those who have been wronged with
the incentive to sue."0 Still others believe that treble damages
106. Stewart, Smith Form SS-3A, supra note 89, at f 4(c).
107. See, e.g., Motor Equip. Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 274,
133 P.2d 149 (1943).
108. Connecticut, Michigan and New Hampshire do not view puni-
tive damages as a penalty. See, e.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575,
577-78, 150 A. 692, 692-93 (1930).
109. See Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act
Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940).
110. See, e.g., Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521,
525 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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are punitive in nature, deterring certain types of conduct."' In
the latter type of jurisdiction, treble damages will probably be
termed a "penalty imposed by law," and thus not covered by the
policy.
Expenses in defense of an action seem to be covered by the
policy even where a criminal sanction or other penalty is im-
posed. The allowance of a tax deduction for expenses incurred
in defense of a criminal suit112 provides an analogy for the prop-
osition that the expenses of an unsuccessful defense are not a
penalty. Public policy is not offended by their deduction since
they arise from an individual's constitutional right to be repre-
sented by counsel."13 They should not be treated as a penalty
merely because other penalties may be imposed in the litigation.
Even if attorney's fees for an unsuccessful criminal defense
are not considered penalties, those fees, as well as other expenses
incurred in an action based on dishonesty, may be disallowed
under another provision excluding any claim
brought about or contributed to by the dishonesty of [the
insured]; however, not withstanding the foregoing [the insured]
shall be protected under the terms of this policy as to any claim
upon which suit may be brought against [the insured], by
reason of any alleged dishonesty on the part of [the insured],
unless a judgment or other final adjudication thereof adverse
to [the insured] shall establish that acts of active and deliberate
dishonesty committed by [the insured] with actual dishonest
purpose and intent were material to the cause of action so
adjudicated."14
This exclusion becomes operative only when the "appropriate"
dishonesty is material to a "judgment or other final adjudication
adverse to" the insider. It is not apparent from the exclusion
what "other final adjudication adverse to" the insider means. It
might possibly refer to a disposition other than judgment, such as
dismissal with prejudice, yet it is difficult to conceive of a dis-
missal wherein the dishonesty would be material. It might also
refer to a judgment against the insider in a suit to compel in-
demnification from the corporation. The exclusion, however,
cannot be invoked without "acts of active and deliberate dis-
honesty committed . . . with actual dishonest purpose and in-
tent." The unsuccessful insider is thus covered if there is merely
an allegation of dishonesty. Presumably, this exclusion would
111. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56
(7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955).
112. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
113. Id. at 690-91.
114. Stewart, Smith Form 33A, supra note 89, at 1 5(e).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
deny coverage for any criminal liability and accompanying ex-
pense, except where there was no criminal intent.1 5
2. Coverage of Status Liabilities
The "wrongful act" clause, unlike the "loss" clause restrict-
ing the insider's coverage, seems to create an ambiguity that may
increase coverage. The insuring clause binds the insurer to re-
imburse any "loss" incurred by reason of a "wrongful act"
of the officer or director while acting in his capacity as an in-
sider, that is, by reason of what he does. A "wrongful act" is
any actual or alleged error or misstatement or misleading state-
ment or act or omission or neglect or breach of duty by the
[insiders] while acting in their individual or collective capaci-
ties or any matter ... claimed against them solely by reason of
their being Directors or Officers of the Company.116
The last portion of this clause provides that an insurable "wrong-
ful act" can be one claimed against the insider solely because of
his capacity as an insider. In particular, this language expressly
states that the insider can be indemnified for liabilities imposed
because of status, that is, because of what he is.11 7
This conflict over whether the policy includes coverage of
liabilities incurred solely because of status in addition to cover-
age of wrongful acts while acting in the capacity of an insider
will probably be resolved in favor of the insured. The usual
insurance policy is written with a broad insuring clause or cov-
erage clause that is limited by subsequent conditions and exclu-
sions. Courts readily give effect to the exclusions "which reduce
the risk otherwise assumed under the insuring clause.""18 There
seems to be no reason why the opposite should not be true:
courts should give effect to the corditions that have the effect
of expanding the coverage, especially when there is an ambiguity
in the insuring clause. Since insuramce contracts are construed
strictly against the insurer,"19 it is probable that status liability
will be covered by the policy.120
115. Those lacking criminal intent would not be covered because of
the limitation in the scope of the "loss" clause wherein criminal penal-
ties are excluded from coverage.
116. Stewart, Smith Form SS-3A, supra note 89, at 1 4(b). [Em-
phasis added].
117. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
118. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 944 n.1 (3d
ed. 1951).
119. E.g., Lange v. Board of Educ., 283 Md. 255, 37 A.2d 317 (1944)
(surety insurance policy).
120. The St. Paul Fire & Marine policy is not subject to this in-
terpretation, There is no provision that would extend coverage to
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Under certain circumstances, however, status liability will
be excluded from coverage by specific exclusions. Liabilities
arising under rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934121 may be denied coverage through the "personal profit ex-
clusion,1122 which operates to deny indemnification for claims
arising from liability where the insider gains a personal, and thus
illegal, profit.1 23 In the absence of personal profit, however, in-
demnification would not be barred even though the insider is
found liable for a violation of rule 10b-5.124
The policy explicitly excludes any claim for an accounting
of the profits resulting from a short-swing transaction under
section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.12 5 Presumably, the expenses of a
successful defense to a 16(b) action are indemnifiable if the pol-
icy is interpreted to cover status liabilities.126
3. Unsuccessful Defenses to Derivative Suits
The insider would greatly benefit from comprehensive cov-
erage of liability arising from derivative suits since this is the
one area where the insider can receive little indemnification di-
rectly from the corporation. If he is unsuccessful in his defense,
liabilities claimed solely because the insider is a director or officer.
The coverage extends only to acts performed while the insider was
acting in his capacity as such.
121. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964).
122. See text accompanying note 128 infra.
123. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
124. E.g., Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.
N.Y. 1966). See generally 3 Loss, SEcuRiiFss REGULATION 1767 et seq.
(2d ed. 1961).
125. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b)
(1964).
126. The fact that status liability might be covered because of the
ambiguity between the "insuring" clause and the "wrongful act" clause
(see text accompanying note 117 supra) is buttressed by the fact that
the only type of status liability specifically excluded from the policy's
coverage is that arising under section 16(b). By implication then,
remaining status liabilities should be covered. Contra, Note, supra
note 94, at 662. Where status liability is not covered, such as in the
St. Paul Fire & Marine policy, there will probably be no recovery for
attorney's fees in the successful defense of the action. The requirement
that the loss arise from an act done in good faith and in the best
interest of the corporation will probably exclude any action alleging use
of insider information; the very nature of this action is that it is not
done in good faith in the best interest of the corporation. Insurance
Against Liabilities of Directors and Officers-A Forum, 22 RECORD o.
N.Y.C.B.A. 342, 363 (1967).
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he will never receive the amount of the judgment. The most
that he can receive is expenses, including permitted attorney's
fees, but then only when he is fahly and equitably deserving
thereof. He would be understandably eager to obtain insurance
which would indemnify him for amounts paid pursuant to a
settlement or judgment.
The policy excludes any claim "based upon or attributable to
[the insider's] gaining in fact any personal profit to which he is
not legally entitled.'1 27  Since virtually every derivative suit
contains an allegation of self-dealing or personal gain, this exclu-
sion would have a devastating effect on the insider if his un-
successful defense would be considered as conclusive on the issue
of personal profit. While an unsuccessful defense might gen-
erally imply personal profit, this is not always so. The real
thrust of the action, for example, may be negligence, not self-
dealing. The insurer can invoke the exclusion where self-deal-
ing has been alleged because, unlike other exclusions,128 there is
no requirement that a court determine applicability prior to the
exclusion's operation. If the insurer invokes this exclusion
whenever the complaint alleges self-dealing, the insider will find
his coverage in derivative suits greatly limited.
The exclusion would also limit coverage in settlements of
derivative actions as well as where judgment has been rendered.
A settlement, even under the authority of the court, does not
attest that the gain was illegal, but the insurer may urge such a
conclusion as a basis for denial of indemnification.
Coverage of liabilities arising from a derivative suit is fur-
ther limited by the exclusion of claims based on
the return by the [insider] of any remuneration paid to [him]
without the previous approval of the stockholders of the Com-
pany which payment without such previous approval shall be
held by the Courts to have been ille.gal.129
This exclusion is narrower than that of "gaining in fact any
personal profit" since it refers solely to the area of compensa-
tion. It is further restricted by the requirement that the com-
pensation be found illegal by a court.
127. Stewart, Smith Form SS-3A, supra note 89, at f 5(b).
128. E.g., Stewart, Smith Form SS-3A, supra note 89, at f 5(c):
.shall be held by the courts to have been illegal."
129. Id.
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4. Material Misstatement Liability
Liabilities are imposed under section 11 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1933130 for fraudulent misrepresentation or non-
disclosure of material facts. The act may be one of active dis-
honesty 31 or passive reliance upon a fellow insider's word. 32 If
the former, and if the dishonesty was material to the adjudica-
tion of liability, the dishonesty exclusion would bar coverage.
In all other cases of section 11 liability, the insider would likely
be indemnified under the policy. Even if passive reliance were
considered dishonest, rather than negligent, conduct, it would not
be considered active or deliberate dishonesty. 133
D. THE ExTENT OF CORPORATE REnBuRSEmENT COVERAGE
The problems of indefinite coverage of fines and penalties
and questionable coverage of status liabilities that were present
with the directors' and officers' coverage are also present with
the companion reimbursement policy. The latter, however, does
not have the former's extensive exclusions that would reduce
its overall coverage.
The reimbursement policy is more restrictive in its coverage
than existing corporate indemnification laws. Only indemnifi-
cation of directors and officers is covered, while the class of in-
dividuals who may be indemnified, at least under the Minnesota
statute, is far wider. 3 4 Thus, a corporation may be bound to in-
demnify a larger class of insiders than that covered by the policy.
In all probability, since the insurer will accept the risk of a newly
created position, the insurer would include in the coverage spe-
cifically enumerated employees and agents. But obviously the
corporation cannot secure coverage of an employee or agent
after its liability to indemnify that employee or agent has been
fixed. In such situations the corporation might find itself with-
out insurance.
Notwithstanding the fact that the coverage inures to a
smaller group of insiders, the reimbursement policy quite ade-
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
131. Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208, 67 App. D.C. 284 (1937), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 726 (1937).
132. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
133. This is particularly true in light of the seemingly mild repri-
mand received by the defendants in BarChris, supra note 132, for ac-
tivities which appeared rather deliberate.
134. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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quately covers the corporation for indemnity payments made to
directors and officers. Its basic inadequacy is the failure to in-
clude fines and penalties. As previously stated, fines and pen-
alties are indemnifiable under the Minnesota statute if the in-
sider meets the appropriate standard of conduct.135 Except for
one company's policy, fines and penalties are not covered by the
insurance. 136
V. CONCLUSION
The primary issue in the desirability of indemnification in-
surance is the extent to which the policy increases the insider's
security over that afforded by the corporation's bylaw. The
first step in this inquiry is the determination of the validity and
extent of the corporation's bylaw. The more limited the bylaw,
the greater the need for insurance. In addition, certain liabili-
ties, such as those incurred in settlement of a derivative action,
are statutorily prohibited from being indemnified by the corpora-
tion. Possible protection against the liabilities involved in the
unsuccessful defense of a derivative suit may well be the mo-
tivating force behind the purchase of insurance. In states other
than Minnesota, these liabilities seem to be reimbursible. It
should be remembered that the 'Minnesota statute proscribes
their coverage where the insurance is maintained by the corpora-
tion since the insurer cannot indemnify where the corporation
is powerless to do so. But even elsewhere, this coverage may be
circumvented by allegations of self-dealing.
From the corporation's viewpoint, the insurance would cover
most of the liabilities for which the corporation could indemnify
the insider. The numerous exceptions in the directors' and offi-
cers' coverage are not present in the companion reimbursement
policy. Except for the fact that the coverage inures to a smaller
group of insiders and fines and penalties are not covered, the
total spectrum of the corporation's exposure is covered. In the
final determination, whether a corporation should buy this in-
surance will depend upon its size. A large corporation may
choose to be a self-insurer whereas a smaller corporation might
desire to insure rather than be forced out of business by a large
uninsured mandatory indemnification. However, the smaller the
corporation, the less likely it will be to carry costly insurance,
135. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
136. St. Paul Fire & Marine extends the corporation's coverage to
any loss it may be required or permitted to pay, thus including fines
and penalties.
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since the premiums, taken together with the deductible and five
percent liability amounts, might produce insolvency just as read-
ily as the impact of the direct liability.
The companion insurance policies have many inadequacies
and ambiguities. The directors' and officers' liability policy, in
particular, suffers from far-reaching and ambiguous exclusions.
In light of this inadequate and uncertain coverage, it is difficult
to judge its exact value with any degree of accuracy. Obviously,
a great many liabilities are covered, especially those resulting
from a negligent act of the insider. Perhaps this coverage of
negligent acts alone is enough to justify the purchase of insur-
ance. In addition, the certainty of indemnification may appeal
to the insider when the solvency of the corporation is question-
able or the corporate bylaw conditions indemnification on the
approval of the board. Yet it would be wrong for either the
corporation or the insider to treat the purchase of the insurance
as a complete funding of liability each must meet. In addition,
the purchase of the insurance for the benefit of the insider by a
large Minnesota corporation operating under a bylaw coexten-
sive with the statute would be of no additional benefit to the in-
sider, since the insider would be unable to receive coverage
greater than that afforded by the bylaw.
